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What are the respective contributions of culture and rationality to 
risk perception? Do disagreements between lay persons and experts 
(and among members of both groups) originate in conflicting values, 
differing abilities to comprehend technical information, or both? If 
conflicting values do play a role, should the law be responsive to popu-
lar perceptions of risk even when expert regulators believe that popu-
lar beliefs are w1'ong? 
These are the central questions in the debate between Professor 
Sunstein and us. We take the position that cultural worldviews per-
vade popular (not to mention expert) risk assessments and that a genu-
ine commitment to democracy forbids simply dismissing such percep-
tions as products of ''bounded rationality."1 Sunstein disagrees.1 
The critical impo1t of Sunstein 's arguments notwithstanding, we 
are grateful for his thoughtful reply to our review essay. We now re-
spond to two of Sunstein 's criticisms, one methodological and the other 
substantive. 
I. MEASURING RISK PERCEPTIONS 
In our study,3 we used a four-point scale to measure each subject's 
rating of how "dangerous" an activity wa5 or how "serious" a risk it 
posed. Sunstein suggests that persons a5ked to appraise risks in this 
way are "not likely to respond with a quantitative analysis of the pro-
jected harm," and that the resulting data therefore ''do not reveal 
much about risk perception as that term is explored in Laws of Fear.'" 
This is a curious criticism for Sunstein to make. One of the great 
strengths of Laws of Fear is its masterful synthesis of the extensive so-
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cial psychology literature on popular risk perceptions. A great deal of 
the work in this field relies on categorical ratings of risk akin to the 
ones in our study. In Laws of Fear, Sunstein himself draws on such 
studies to support his arguments.5 
No measure of risk perceptions is perfect. But one that uses cate-
gorical appraisals like those in our study offers several advantages 
over one that asks subjects to attempt to quantify the risks (say, by 
guessing the "expected annual deaths'iti) associated with putatively 
dangerous activities. 
One advantage is that quantitative measures have been shown to 
lack reliability and validity. The results they generate (whether ad-
ministered to lay persons or experts) are highly sensitive to item word-
ing and other framing problems that do not, as a matter of theory or 
empirical data, admit of any clear solution.7 Categorical scales do re-
liably reflect variation in attitudes, between different persons and 
across risks, without the misleading implication that those attitudes re-
flect stable and genuine actuarial appraisals.8 
Another advantage of categorical scales comes from the centrality 
of affect in risk perceptions. Indiv iduals tend to conform their ap-
praisals of all dimensions of risk evaluation - including expected 
benefit and expected harm - to the positive or negative feelings that 
risky activities provoke.9 Sunstein surmises, reasonably, that subjects 
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asked to report their risk perceptions using a categorical "seriousness" 
scale likely will rely on a "rapid, intuitive judgment ... that reflects 
... affect." 10 But because affect most powerfully explains public esti-
mations of the various components of acceptable risk, this is a virtue, 
not a vice, of such a scale. 
A final important reason to elicit subjects' more general appraisals 
of risk "seriousness," rather than their "quantitative" guesses about risk 
incidence, has to do with the purpose of studying popular risk percep-
tions. What we are all trying to figure out - Sunstein included - is 
how popular risk perceptions influence political responses to risk and 
what normative significance the law should give to such perceptions. 
Such an inquiry, then, should take as its focus the types of judgment 
that in fact animate popular and political debates about risk. 
When ordinary citizens take a position - by voting, by expressing 
their opinion in the media, by making contributions to political candi-
dates and causes - they are unlikely to be motivated by some abstract 
"quantitative analysis" of the danger of guns, of global warming, of 
various public health risks, and so forth. Rather, they are acting on 
their feelings, which are likely to reflect a complex of interacting in-
strumental and expressive judgments. 11 
As Sunstein suggests, a response measure that asks respondents to 
state how "serious" a risk is will pick up not just "anticipated harm[s] 
[and] the cost[s]" but also "related moral and political" concerns!? Pre-
cisely because these are all part of the package of judgments that mo-
tivate public reactions to risk, a risk-perception measure that captures 
all of them is ideal for scholars who are trying to figure out where such 
attitudes come from and what impact they have on lawmaking. 
Of course, to say that scholars should use a measure that includes 
all the elements of risk perception - instrumental, affective, expres-
sive - isn't necessarily to say that popular perceptions should be 
normative for law. Indeed, exactly because we - including Sunstein 
- are also trying to determine what effect such perceptions should be 
given in a democratic society, it is essential to use a measure that 
makes it possible to assess how such perceptions are formed and of 
what they consist. We believe that a categorical scale of the kind we 
used is better suited for those purposes than any measure that asks lay 
persons to engage in bare "quantitative analysis" of risks. 
option;contcnt&task;view&id;99 (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). 
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IT. DOES BOUNDED RAT[ONALITY "LIE BEH1ND" 
CULTURAL COGNITr0N? 
Sunstein also presents a provocative substantive criticism of our 
"cultural evaluator model" of risk perception. We challenged his posi-
tion - which we called the "irrational weigher model" - on the 
ground that many of the public (mis)perceptions of risk that Sunstein 
attributes to bounded rationality in fact express coherent cultural 
worldviews, and as such must be taken seriously in any policymaking 
scheme that purports to be democratic. Sunstein turns the table on us. 
Properly understood, he argues, "' cultural cognition ' is largely a result 
of bounded rationality, not an alternative to it."13 According to Sun-
stein, the distribution of risk perceptions that we attribute to cultural 
worldviews in fact reflects two mechanisms - social influences and 
"normative bias" - that inevitably fill the void associated with defects 
in human reasoning power. 14 Because these artifacts of "bounded ra-
tionality lie behind cultural cognition,"15 a regime in which policymak-
ing is shielded from cultural evaluations of risk remains faithful to the 
principle that democracies "should respond to people's values, rather 
than to their blunders."16 
In our view, Sunstein 's assertion that "bounded rationality lie[s] be-
hind cultural cognition" merges two claims, one of which is clearly 
wrong and the other of which might be right. The clearly wrong claim 
is that one would expect persons who are boundedly rational to behave 
like cultural evaluators just because they are boundedly rational. It is 
indeed well established that people conform their factual beliefs both 
to the apparent view of others (through mechanisms such as "group 
polarization,"11 "reactive devaluation,"16 and "nai:ve realism"19) and to 
their own values (through mechanisms such as "biased assimilation"zo 
and "defensive motivation"1'). But these dynamics don't tell us which 
13 /d.atrrrr. 
14 See id. at r r 18- 19. 
1s T d. at r I r8. 
16 Id. at II25. 
17 See Cass R . Sunstein, Deliberative Ti·ouble? Why G:Youps Go to Extremes, rro YALE L.J. 71, 
74 (2oor). 
18 Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and C01if/ict Resolution, in BARRrERS TO 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995). 
19 See Robert J. Robinson, Daehler Kellner, Andrew Ward & Lee Ross, Actual Versus Assumed 
Differences in Co11stntal: "Naive Realism" in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 404 (1995). 
20 See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Pola,·i-
zation: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered E1,-idence, 11 J. PERSONALITY 
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group commitments (professional or geographic, political or socio-
economic) or which values (ideological, religious, aesthetic) will exert 
this impact on belief formation. They thus furnish no explanation for 
any particular distribution of beliefs across persons or issues, much less 
for why beliefs are in fact distributed in ways that express persons' 
commitments to hierarchic or egalitarian, individualistic or communi-
tarian worldviews. 
The most plausible way to make sense of these patterns of belief is 
to view culture as prior to the cognitive processes through which peo-
ple perceive facts. Perhaps because of upbringing, perhaps because of 
genetic disposition, or perhaps because of some combination of the 
two, people form hierarchic, egalitarian, individualistic, or communi-
tarian cultural commitments. These commitments, in turn, supply the 
values to which individuals conform their beliefs and define the rele-
vant groups within which social influences on belief operate. Bounded 
rationality, then, does not explain why people behave like cultural 
evaluators; on the contrary, the disposition of people to behave like 
cultural evaluators explains why established mechanisms of belief for-
mation - social influences, biased assimilation, the availability heuris-
tic, probability neglect, affect, etc. - generate the distinctive array of 
beliefs that boundedly rational people actually hold. 
The second version of Sunstein 's claim - the one that might be 
right - is that the beliefs people form as a result of cultural cognition 
are not entitled to normative weight in democratic decisionmaking. 
The cultural cognition thesis says that individuals, because they can't 
easily access or make sense of complicated empirical data on disputed 
policy issues (Does the death penalty deter? Is global warming a seri-
ous threat? Does private possession of guns increase or decrease 
crime?), must rely on cognitive processes grounded in their cultural 
commitments. But this is arguably nothing more than an account of 
where beliefs come from, and indeed an account that explains why in-
dividuals might persistently form incorrect beliefs in the face of com-
pelling empirical evidence. Democracy, as Sunstein says, should be re-
sponsive to "values," not "blunders," and if cultural cognition gives us 
just another account of how people blunder, it gives us just another 
reason to design decisionmaking procedures that are immune from 
popular beliefs. 
The reason that we're unsure this conclusion is right is the one we 
emphasized in our review. The origin of even incorrect factual beliefs 
in cultural values that are prior to cognition calls the "blunder"-"value" 
criterion into serious doubt. As cultural evaluators, individuals adopt 
Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Accepting 1'/n·eatening Iufor111atio11: Self-Affirmation and the R e-
duction of Defensive Biases, r r CURRENT DmECTTONS TN PSYCH. SC1. r r9 (2 002). 
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the factual beliefs about risk that express their commitments to one or 
another vision of the good society. In this circumstance, expressive 
valuations ("capitalism denigrates social solidarity"; "owning a gun en-
ables self-reliance") will be essentially interchangeable with corre-
sponding factual beliefs ("commerce and industry threaten the envi-
ronment"; "owning a gun makes society safer"). Accordingly, if we 
give politically insulated experts the power to reject popular factual 
beliefs about risks as "blunders," we are necessarily delegating to them 
the power to override public ''values" as well.u 
Nevertheless, if we came off sounding as if we think democracy en-
tails respecting all culturally grounded risk perceptions, no matter how 
empirically misguided they might be, we overstated our position. We 
admit to a fair measure of ambivalence about when beliefs formed as a 
result of cultural cognition merit normative respect within a democ-
ratic society. 
For one thing, to say that a belief is founded on culture obviously 
isn't to say that it is fixed in stone. As we emphasized in our review, 23 
once the dynamics of cultural cognition are understood, it should be 
possible to devise various risk-communication strategies that enable 
citizens to accept new information, and ultimately change their minds, 
without experiencing a threat to their cultural identities. We believe 
citizens of a deliberative democracy would agree that law should be 
used to help persons of diverse cultural worldviews converge on em-
pirically sound beliefs about risk. Accordingly, we see it as perfectly 
consistent with democratic principles for regulators to promote belief-
shaping policies of this sort rather than accept uncritically whatever 
culturally grounded beliefs the majority happens to hold. 
Moreover, even when beliefs founded on cultural cognition resist 
change, they might still supply illegitimate grounds for democratic 
lawmaking. When citizens are motivated by cultural cognition, they 
are in effect demanding that risk regulation (on guns, on the environ-
ment, on public health issues) take the position that best expresses 
their preferred vision of a good society. It might be unreasonable, even 
in a democratic society, to indulge that demand if doing so exposes 
others (including those who hold competing visions) to significant 
physical harm or restrictions on liberty. Or it might sometimes be ap-
propriate to resist that demand if the vision of society being expressed 
is morally repugnant (perhaps because it is inconsistent with democ-
ratic values, like equality and liberty). Or maybe the demand for cul-
turally expressive risk regulation should always be resisted, either to 
22 See Kahan et al., supra note 2, at r 104--06. 
23 See id. at ro96--04. 
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implement liberal democratic neutrality or to steer democratic politics 
away from divisive forms of status competition.24 
This is obviously only a small first step toward coming to terms 
with the normative implications of the cultural evaluator model. Sun-
stein's thoughtful reply has helped us to see just how far we have to 
go. But by the same token, we hope this response will help him to see 
that simply dismissing culturally grounded risk perceptions as "blun-
ders" founded in ''bounded rationality" is a step in the wrong direction. 
24 See id. al r 10 6 --08 . 
